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Does the Texas Homosexual
Conduct Law Violate
the Fourteenth Amendment?
by Dale Carpenter
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 341-349. © 2003 American Bar Association.

Dale Carpenter is an associate
professor at the University of
Minnesota Law School, where
he teaches in the areas of
constitutional law, the First
Amendment, and sexual
0 rientation and the law. He was the
co-author of an amicus brief for
the Republican Unity Coalition in
support of the petitioners in
Lawrence v. Texas. He can be
reached at (612) 625-5537 or
dalecarp@umn.edu.

This case raises once again the issue
of the rights and status of gay men
and women in our society.
Specifically, it involves a constitutional challenge to a state "sodomy"
law, a matter last considered by the
Supreme Court 17 years ago in
Bowers v. Hardwick. In Bowers,
the Court rejected an argument that
a Georgia sodomy law (as applied to
same-sex conduct) violated the
constitutional right of privacy. In
addition to asking the Court to
overrule its privacy holding in
Bowers, the two men convicted for
having sex with each other in this
case argue that the Texas law
unconstitutionally discriminates
against them in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee
to every citizen "the equal protection of the laws."

IssuEs
Did petitioners' criminal convictions
under Section 21.06 of the Texas

Penal Code (the Homosexual
Conduct law) violated their constitutional rights to liberty and
privacy, as protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment?
Did petitioners' criminal convictions
under the Homosexual Conduct
law violate the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection
of the law?
Should Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186 (1986), be overruled?
FACTS
Late in the evening of September
17, 1998, responding to a false
report from a citizen that a man
armed with a gun was "going crazy"
in the Houston apartment of John
Lawrence, sheriffs officers from
Harris County, Texas, entered
Lawrence's apartment. (The person
who called in the report to the
(Continued on Page 342)
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police later admitted his allegations
were untrue and was subsequently
convicted of filing a false report.)
Once inside the apartment, according to the police report, the officers
saw Lawrence and Tyron Garner
having anal sex in violation of the
Homosexual Conduct law, which
criminalizes "deviate sexual intercourse" between persons of the
same sex. "Deviate sexual intercourse," under Texas law, is defined
as "any contact between any part of
the genitals of one person and the
mouth of or anus of another person," or "the penetration of the genitals or anus of another person with
an object." Violation is punishable
by a fine of up to $500.
The officers arrested Lawrence and
Garner (the petitioners), put them
in jail, and released them the next
day. Petitioners were each charged
in a Harris County Justice of the
Peace court under the Homosexual
Conduct law.
Petitioners were convicted and
fined. They then appealed to the
Harris County Criminal Court and
moved to quash the complaints
against them on the grounds that
the Homosexual Conduct law violates the Fourteenth Amendment's
guarantees of equal protection and
the right of privacy, both on its face
and as applied to their "consensual,
adult, private sexual relations with
another person of the same sex."
On December 22, 1998, the criminal court denied their motions. The
court found them guilty, fined them
each $200, and ordered them to pay
court costs of $141.25.
Petitioners next appealed to the
Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth
District of Texas, based in Houston.
They again argued that the
Homosexual Conduct law impermissibly discriminates between citizens
and invades the right of privacy protected by the federal constitution.

At oral argument before the court of
appeals, counsel for the state conceded that there is no "compelling
state interest" justifying the law. On
June 8, 2000, by a 2-1 vote, a panel
of the court of appeals reversed
petitioners' convictions under the
Texas Equal Rights Amendment,
which prohibits governmental discrimination on the basis of sex.
On March 15, 2001, after rehearing
en bane, the court of appeals reinstated petitioners' convictions by a
vote of 7-2. First, relying on the
Supreme Court's decision in
Bowers, the court of appeals rejected petitioners' privacy claim.
Second, the court rejected petitioners' equal protection claim by holding that the statute "advances a
legitimate state interest, namely,
preserving public morals." The
court further held that, on the basis
of this moral justification, the state
could rationally distinguish between
identical acts performed by persons
of the opposite sex and persons of
the same sex. Finally, the court of
appeals held that the Homosexual
Conduct law does not violate the
Texas Equal Rights Amendment
because the statute applies equally
to men and women and thus does
not discriminate on the basis of sex.
Two dissenters argued that "[t]he
contention that the same conduct is
moral for some but not for others
merely repeats, rather than legitimizes, the Legislature's unconstitutional edict."
On April 17, 2002, the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals, the state's
highest court handling criminal
matters, denied petitioners' appeal
without a written opinion. On
December 2, 2002, the Supreme
Court granted their petition for a
writ of certiorari.

CASE ANALYSIS
Adopted in 1973, Texas's
Homosexual Conduct law is barely
30 years old. Its predecessor statute,
adopted in 1943, forbade oral and
anal sex for both opposite- and
same-sex couples. Before 1943, a
Texas law (originally adopted in
1860) had criminalized "the abominable and detestable crime against
nature," a phrase understood to prohibit anal (but not oral) sex for both
opposite- and same-sex couples.
Also in 1973, the Texas legislature
generally liberalized its sex laws,
decriminalizing adultery, fornication, and even bestiality. And while
opposite-sex couples are now free to
engage in "deviate sexual intercourse," same-sex couples are not.
Thus, the 1973 Texas Homosexual
Conduct law represents an expansion of the types of acts historically
prohibited (both anal and oral sex
are now covered, though only anal
sex was covered before 1943) and a
narrowing of the class of people
historically covered (same-sex, but
not opposite-sex, couples are now
covered). While nine states now
have sodomy laws that apply to
both opposite- and same-sex conduct, only four states (including
Texas) have sodomy laws that target
same-sex conduct alone.
Petitioners make two basic arguments that the Homosexual
Conduct law is unconstitutional: (1)
it violates their liberty and privacy
interests protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment; and (2) it discriminates without any legitimate justification or rational basis in violation
of the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
Under their Due Process Clause
argument, petitioners contend that
all adults have a fundamental liberty
and privacy interest in making their
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own choices about private, noncommercial, consensual sexual relations, free from intrusion by the
state. "This fundamental protection," argue petitioners, "is rooted
in three well-recognized aspects of
personal liberty-in intimate relationships, in bodily integrity, and
in the privacy of the home."
Texas emphasizes a different framework for understanding the substantive rights protected by the Due
Process Clause. First, in several cases the Court has made clear it will
protect under its "substantive due
process" doctrine only those liberty
interests "deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition"
and "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty." Second, the
Court has required a "careful
description" of the fundamental
liberty interest claimed.
A key disagreement between petitioners and the state is over how
broadly to characterize the liberty
and/or privacy interest at stake in
the case. Petitioners contend the
interest at issue is a broad right of
individuals to make their own
choices about private, consensual
sexual relations. Texas, by contrast,
characterizes the interest at issue as
only a much more specific "right to
engage in sodomy," "a right to
engage in homosexual anal intercourse," or "a right to engage in
deviate sexual intercourse."
As between characterizing the issue
broadly and characterizing it narrowly, Texas acknowledges "the level of specificity at which the
nation's traditions are to be analyzed ... does not seem to have been
definitively resolved at this time."
But, argues Texas, that does not
matter because petitioners "cannot
establish a tradition of exalting and
protecting the conduct for which
they were prosecuted at any level of
specificity."

Applying petitioners' broad characterization of the liberty interest at
stake yields some support for the
view that it has been protected in
American law. To support their view
that the Constitution protects adult
choices to enter and maintain "intimate relationships," petitioners cite
the Court's decisions protecting a
married couple's right to use contraceptives, Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965), its extension
of that principle to unmarried people, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1972), and its continuing protection of a woman's right to decide
whether to have an abortion,
Planned Parenthoodof
Southeastern Pennsylvaniav.
CaseY, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
The Homosexual Conduct law,
petitioners contend, "destroys that
freedom by forbidding most sexual
behavior for all same-sex couples,
whether they are in a committed,
long-standing relationship, a growing one, or a new one."
Texas counters that the right to intimate association, whatever else it
protects, has never been understood
to "protect any and all sexual conduct in which [persons] might
engage in the context of [a] relationship." Texas argues that the
Court's due process cases protect
only "marriage, procreation and
childrearing." Homosexual sodomy,
argues Texas, "has nothing to do
with marriage or conception or
parenthood and it is not on a par
with those sacred choices." Texas
urges the Court to draw the line of
constitutional protection for sexual
intimacy "at the threshold of the
marital bedroom." Texas does not
explain how that position fits with
the Court's decision in Eisenstadt,
which extended to nmarried
people the right to obtain and
use contraceptives.
Petitioners argue the Texas law also
invades a person's right to "bodily

integrity" by "dictating that citizens
may not share sexual intimacy
unless they perform acts approved
by the legislature, and by attempting to coerce them to select a sexual
partner of the opposite sex."
Texas responds that the Court's
decisions regarding the importance
of "bodily integrity" should be
understood more narrowly to protect against unwarranted government invasion of an individual's
body (as in forcing unwanted
medical procedures on a person).
Further, petitioners argue, the law's
intrusions on the individual's interest in forming intimate relationships
and in bodily integrity can be
accomplished only by invading the
sanctity of the home-long a constitutionally protected domain. The
methods police would use to gather
evidence of violations of the law
would include obtaining warrants to
search for evidence of illegal sexual
activity, interrogating people about
details of their intimate personal
lives, surveillance, wiretaps, confidential informants, and questioning
neighbors. These common investigatory techniques, argue petitioners,
are "repugnant and unthinkable in
the context of adult consensual sexual relations" in a way that they
would not be for "ordinary criminal
conduct that happens to occur in
the home."
Texas responds that constitutional
regard for the home takes the form
of procedural protections against
unreasonable police entry and
search. But, Texas adds, such procedural rights have never been understood as a substantive shield to otherwise criminal activity merely
because it takes place in the home.
Petitioners argue generally that
there should be no "gay exception"
to fundamental liberty and privacy
(Continued on Page 344)
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interests. They argue that homosexuality is a "normal and natural manifestation of human sexuality," a
conclusion supported by mentalhealth professionals and social-science researchers who have found no
significant differences between gay
and straight people in the need for
love and intimacy or in the ability
to form durable relationships. Texas
does not dispute these empirical
claims, although several of its supporting amici do.
Tradition and history have
undoubtedly influenced the Court's
substantive due process doctrine.
Capitalizing on this fact, Texas
argues that all of the original 13
states had sodomy laws, as did 32
of the 37 states at the time of ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. Until 1961, all 50 states had
sodomy laws.
Even on this question of the historical significance of general sodomy
laws, however, there is disagreement. Petitioners dispute the idea
that the Homosexual Conduct law
partakes of a long-standing national
tradition. Despite the oft-repeated
claim that "sodomy" laws have
"ancient roots," petitioners note
that historically these proscriptions
applied to both opposite- and samesex conduct. At the time of the
ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 29 of the 32 states
with sodomy laws applied them to
both opposite- and same-sex acts.
The remaining three state sodomy
laws were possibly limited to proscribing anal sex between men
(though even this is debatable), but
none were aimed generally at
"same-sex" acts. Not until 1969 did
a state limit its sodomy law to samesex conduct as a category unto
itself. Texas makes no response to
these distinctions in the historical
coverage of sodomy laws.

~EKB1

Further, petitioners add, the nation
has steadily moved away from such
laws: from 1961, when all 50 states
criminalized sodomy; to 1986 (the
year the Court decided Bowers),
when 24 states did so; to today,
when only 13 states still have such
prohibitions. Texas counters that a
recent trend toward decriminalization does not establish a deeply
rooted tradition of protecting a right
to engage in sodomy. "The petitioners mistake new growth for deep
roots," Texas contends.
Against a fundamental liberty interest in sexual autonomy and privacy,
argue petitioners, the state asserts
only a desire to protect prevailing
moral principles. To petitioners, this
amounts to an assertion that the
government may intrude on individuals' fundamental rights whenever a
majority wants to do so. Yet, petitioners note, the very point of protecting fundamental rights in a
Constitution is to insulate them
from the majority's preferences.
Texas, quoting at length from a
famous concurring opinion of
Justice Harlan 40 years ago,
responds that "society is not limited
in its objects only to the physical
well-being of the community, but
has traditionally concerned itself
with the moral soundness of its people as well." To immunize consensual, private sexual behavior from
criminal law, Harlan wrote, "'would
be to withdraw from community
concern a range of subjects with
which every society in civilized
times has found it necessary to
deal." Among these oft-regulated
subjects, Harlan noted, are "homosexual practices."
Recognizing that Bowers stands in
the way of their substantive due
process argument, petitioners urge
the Court to overrule it. Changing
times and greater understanding of
facts about gays have undercut
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Bowers, contend petitioners. Since
Bowers, the country has "steadily
moved toward rejecting secondclass-citizen status" for gays by
eliminating sodomy laws, adopting
antidiscrimination laws in 13 states
and numerous municipalities,
enhancing penalties for hate crimes,
and legally recognizing the rights of
gay couples and parents.
Texas urges the Court to stand by
Bowers. Arguing that 17 years is "a
very brief period indeed," Texas
contends that recent trends should
not affect the analysis of what constitutes a right deeply rooted in the
nation's history and tradition. Under
a federal system in which states
serve as laboratories for different
social policies, argues Texas, a state
should be as free to resist a trend as
to join it. "All change is not for the
better," observes Texas, "and the
right [of a state] to be first [to adopt
a public policy] should be accompanied by a right to be last to accept a
change of debatable social value."
The second argument for petitioners
rests on the Equal Protection
Clause. In order to pass minimal
constitutional muster, a law must
bear at least (1) a rational relationship (2) to an independent and
legitimate governmental purpose.
The Court thus looks at both the
means ("rational relationship") and
the ends ("legitimate governmental
purpose") embodied in a law.
Petitioners attack the Homosexual
Conduct law as lacking a legitimate
governmental purpose. According to
petitioners, the state's morality justification has three flaws. First, it
simply "restates that Texas believes
in and wants to have this criminal
law." This defense of the law is "'circular" and would give "'carte
blanche" to majority sentiment,
leaving any targeted group (here,
gays) unprotected.

Issue No. 6

Second, petitioners argue, the
state's morality justification reflects
"mere negative attitudes about the
disfavored group." This is an impermissible basis for discrimination
under the Court's opinions in many
cases, including its decision seven
years ago in Romer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 620 (1996), which
invalidated a state constitutional
amendment that stripped gays alone
of all civil-rights protections. The
flaw in the Texas law is not that it
promotes a moral code, contend
petitioners, but that it imposes a
"discriminator,moral code."
Finally, petitioners argue, there is
no other justification for the law,
such as a legitimate concern about
forced sex, commercial sex, or public sex, which are properly criminalized under Texas law regardless of
the sex of those involved in them.
Texas responds that the law promotes "the longstanding moral traditions of the State against homosexual conduct." This counts as a
legitimate state interest for equal
protection purposes, Texas argues,
and is supported by the Court's
holding in Bowers, which "stands
alone as the only modern case in
which this Court has approved
moral tradition as a submitted rational basis for legislation."
Texas argues its law is not aimed at
gays as a group and so does not run
afoul of the Court's opinion in
Romer. The Homosexual Conduct
law "does not expressly classify its
offenders on the basis of their sexual orientation," as did the state constitutional amendment invalidated
in Romer, but only on the basis of
"homosexual conduct." Under this
view, both heterosexuals and homosexuals who engage in prohibited
same-sex conduct are equally punished under the law.

One of petitioners' supporting amici
compares this defense of the Texas
law to the claim that the law prohibits rich and poor alike from
sleeping under bridges: everyone
may be formally "equal" under the
state's classification prohibiting
"homosexual conduct," but some
people (heterosexuals) are obviously
more equal than others.
Further, according to petitioners,
the Homosexual Conduct law serves
to legitimize discrimination against
gays in areas of life beyond sexual
intimacy. Sodomy laws are often
invoked to deny or restrict gay parents' custody of or visitation with
their own children, to prevent gays
from serving as foster parents, to
deny public employment to gay
people, to oppose civil-rights ordinances protecting people from discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation in private employment,
housing, and public accommodations, and to block protection of gay
citizens under hate-crime legislation. Finally, the equal protection
problem should be analyzed, argue
petitioners, in the context of "the
persistent and destructive American
history of anti-gay discrimination."
Texas makes no response to petitioners' claims about the secondary
effects of its law.
In its brief, Texas now offers a second legitimate purpose for the classification in its Homosexual
Conduct law: avoiding litigation
over, and possible invalidation of,
the more comprehensive predecessor sodomy statute that reached
even the sexual conduct of married
couples. After the Court's decision
in Griswold protecting marital privacy, Texas argues that it was reasonable for the state legislature in
1973 to think it needed to narrow
the reach of its sodomy law so that
it would not criminalize some forms
of marital sex. Given that asserted
concern, Texas does not explain

why the 1973 revision of the state's
sodomy law protected all oppositesex couples, whether married or
not-leaving only same-sex couples
criminalized.
Texas conspicuously does not rely
on a public-health justification for
its law, as several of its supporting
amici do. Although protecting public health is surely a legitimate governmental purpose, Texas's supporting amici do not show how this justification is rationally related to a
law criminalizing same-sex conduct.
They offer no argument or evidence
that sodomy statutes in general, or
the Texas law in particular, have
had any effect on rates of sexually
transmitted diseases, including HIV.
In its brief, Texas concedes that
"the statute is unlikely to deter
many individuals with an exclusively homosexual orientation" but may
"to some degree" deter "the remaining population ... from detrimentally
experimenting in homosexual conduct." Texas does not assert, and
offers no argument or evidence, that
its law has affected rates of STD or
HIV infection in the state. Given
this, and given Texas's acknowledgment that its law is unlikely to deter
much actual sexual activity (and
none among gays), the law appears
to have no connection to publichealth concerns.
In a footnote, petitioners briefly suggest that the Court should apply
heightened equal protection scrutiny to laws, such as the Homosexual
Conduct law, that (1) "use a sexualorientation-based classification" or
that (2) "employ[] a gender-based
classification to discriminate against
gay people." Petitioners do not brief
either issue, although some of their
supporting amici do.
Texas counters that federal courts
have never adopted heightened
(Continued on Page 346)
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scrutiny for sexual-orientation discrimination. It also argues that this
is not a case of sex discrimination
because the law "indulges in no
stereotypes about the respective
capabilities of men and women, and
it does not penalize one gender at
the expense of the other." Some of
Texas's supporting amici offer additional arguments on these points.
Finally, Texas and several of its
amici urge the Court to dismiss the
petition as improvidently grantedmeaning, basically, the Court made
a mistake in taking the case at all.
As to petitioners' substantive due
process argument, Texas reasons
that while petitioners claim a right
of adults to engage in private, noncommercial, consensual sexual intimacy with an unrelated adult of the
same sex, the factual record does
not support that petitioners actually
fit these criteria. The record,
according to Texas, does not show
that petitioners' act was noncommercial, consensual, or private, or
that they are unrelated to each other. (At the same time, however,
neither petitioner was charged
with prostitution, rape, public
lewdness, or incest.) Thus, the state
concludes, the petitioners "should
not be permitted to argue that a
protected liberty interest exists
under some set of circumstances
without showing that those circumstances actually exist."
Similarly, as to petitioners' equal
protection claim, Texas argues they
have not shown they belong to any
group of persons classified and disadvantaged by the law. They have
not shown, for example, that they
are gay.
Petitioners, however, have launched
a facial challenge to the Homosexual
Conduct law under which they argue
that the law is unconstitutional in
all its applications, regardless of the

particular facts in a given case to
which the law is applied. As to the
equal protection claim, they may
argue that (1) the law classifies people based on whether or not they
engage in defined "homosexual conduct" and that (2) the record shows
they engaged in it. This in itself
shows membership in a group classified and disadvantaged by the law,
regardless of whether petitioners
have established that they are "gay."
SIGNIFICANCE
This case has potentially enormous
significance both specifically for the
Court's Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence and generally for the
legal, political, and cultural status of
gay Americans.
Start with the possible implications
of the case for the Court's
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence-both the Due Process
Clause and the Equal Protection
Clause. The potential implications
for the Court's substantive due
process doctrine depend on who
wins and under what reasoning.
If the Court agrees with Texas that
the Due Process Clause does not
prohibit state sodomy laws, it will
reinforce its decision in Bowers.
More importantly for future cases, it
may also affirm that its substantive
due process methodology involves
both (1) relying on longstanding
legal traditions in recognizing substantive rights and (2) defining
claimed liberty interests at a very
specific level of generality. Together,
these requirements have led the
Court to shut off the Due Process
Clause as a fount for substantive
rights protected by the judiciary.
If the Court sides with petitioners
on the Due Process Clause claim,
there will be both immediate and
potential long-term effects. The
immediate effect would be to invali-
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date the Texas sodomy law and,
likely, the sodomy laws of the other
12 states that still have them.
The long-term significance of a
due process victory for petitioners
depends on how the Court resolves
the many difficult issues raised.
For example, how will the Court
characterize the right being asserted
by the petitioners? If the right is
characterized broadly, as petitioners
suggest it should be, the Court's
decision could well signal a rebirth
in judicial scrutiny of state legislation affecting personal libertiesespecially sexual liberty.
Much would then depend on how
the Court drew the line on what is
protected and what is not. The
Court might eventually have to offer
some guidance on what sexual activities states could continue to regulate and why. Prostitution?
Adultery? Fornication? Adult
incest? Other activities traditionally
prohibited by states and indulged
in by adults in the home, such as
illicit drug use or suicide, might
also need to be distinguished.
While distinguishing some of these
activities might be easy based on
the special harms they are thought
to cause or a lack of true consent,
others (such as fornication) would
be more difficult.
Next, consider the potential implications for equal protection doctrine.
If Texas wins on the equal protection issue, the implications may be
small in one sense but very large in
another. On the one hand, the
Court's opinion could simply recite
that Texas has a legitimate moral
(or litigation-avoidance) justification
and that its law is rationally tailored
to support that justification. Such a
holding might break little new
ground. On the other hand, as the
first significant post-Romer decision
on how much the Equal Protection

Issue No. 6

Clause really protects targeted
groups from bare majoritarian preferences unaccompanied by a
testable means-ends fit, it might signal a retreat from the Court's stated
commitment to the principle that
the Constitution "neither knows nor
tolerates classes among its citizens."
If the Court sides with petitioners
on the equal protection claim,
there will be both immediate and
potential long-term implications.
The immediate consequence will be
the invalidation of the Texas law
and likely the laws of the three
other states that also criminalize
only same-sex conduct. This
consequence would be smaller than
the immediate consequence of a
due process victory for petitioners,
which would invalidate the sodomy
laws of all 13 states that still have
them. However, gay-equality
advocates might ultimately be able
to use an equal protection victory
against Texas as a basis for challenging sodomy laws in the remaining
nine states by arguing that these
laws-though facially applicable to
everyone-in fact disparately
impact gay people.
The long-term consequences of an
equal protection victory for petitioners depend, again, on how the Court
resolves the many difficult issues
raised. This is a rare case in which a
state offers, as virtually its only justification for a classification, a
desire to promote public morality. It
raises an issue the Court avoided
addressing in Romer: the strength,
extent, and nature of the power of
the states to legislate in the interest
of promoting morality.
If the Court sides with petitioners
on the equal protection claim, how
will it deal with the state's asserted
morality justification? Consider
three possibilities. One possibility is
that the Court could hold that
morality alone is never a legitimate

state interest on rational-basis
review of a state's classification.
Under this approach the state would
have to offer some additional justification, presumably a harm-based
justification, beyond morality. It
would be a departure from the
Court's prior indications that a state
may regulate in the interest of public morality and, indeed, from its
statement in Bowers that much law
reflects essentially moral views.
It may also involve the Court in
defining what counts as a "harmbased justification," in other words,
requiring the articulation of a
constitutional harm principle
that gives states guidance on what
harms will count as constitutionally
regulable harm.
A second possibility is that the
Court could hold that while morality alone can be a legitimate basis for
legislation, the state's asserted moral
interest in this case-moral opposition to homosexual conduct-is an
impermissible moral justification.
The Court might conclude, for
example, that the moral justification
here amounts to nothing more than
a bare desire to harm an unpopular
group (animus). This approach is
suggested, though never explicitly
urged, by petitioners. If the Court
adopted this approach, it would signal a general suspicion of laws that
target gays since many such laws
embody a moral judgment about
homosexuality (though these other
laws, like the ban on gays in the
military, could well have justifications beyond simply expressing
moral disapproval of homosexual
acts). It would also seem to involve
the Court in distinguishing constitutionally permissible moral views
from constitutionally impermissible
moral views as justifications for legislation-and in finding a constitutional basis for doing so.
A third possibility is that the Court
could hold that while morality alone

can be a legitimate basis for legislation, when coupled with strong indications that animus also motivated
the particular classification challenged, the state must adduce some
additional harm-based justification
in order to survive rationality
review. This is an approach suggested by an umici.s brief supporting
petitioners, a brief that finds ample
indicia of animus in the text, context, history, and structure of the
Texas law. This may well be the
least aggressive equal protection
option for the Court, since it would
be more deferential to state morals
regulation than the other two
options. As with the first possibility,
however, this approach may involve
the Court in defining what counts as
a harm-based justification for purposes of the Constitution.
The Court could avoid these rational-basis equal protection issues by
deciding that some form of heightened scrutiny should apply to the
Texas law. The Court might decide,
as one of petitioners' supporting
atnici urges, that the Texas law
effectively discriminates on the
basis of sexual orientation and that
such discrimination should be subject to heightened scrutiny. Since
Texas has conceded it has no compelling interest in the law, it would
likely be unconstitutional under this
approach. Such a rationale would
call into question all laws that classify or disadvantage gays, from the
ban on gays in the military to laws
that limit marriage to opposite-sex
couples. (The military's gay ban
might survive even heightened
scrutiny, however, due to courts'
traditional deference to the judgments of military authorities about
their special needs.)
Application of heightened scrutiny
to sexual-orientation discrimination
might also have collateral consequences for federal civil rights laws,
(Continued on Page 348)
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specifically with respect to the ability of gay people to seek redress for
governmental discrimination under
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Court could also decide, as
another of the petitioners' supporting amici urges, that the Texas law
is a form of sex discrimination
because it classifies, on the basis of
sex, who may engage in the prohibited conduct with whom. If the
Court accepts this argument, the
Texas law would be subject to intermediate scrutiny and would likely
be held unconstitutional. Such a
rationale might call into question,
among other things, laws banning
same-sex marriage.
Of course, the Court could also
entirely avoid-for now at leastthe substantive constitutional
issues by dismissing the petition
on the grounds offered by Texas
and its amici.
Now consider the significance of the
case for the general legal, political,
and cultural status of gay
Americans. Though the petitioners
understandably highlight the privacy and liberty interests into which
the Texas law intrudes, the practical
impact of the law has little to do
with intimacy, bodily integrity, or
the sanctity of the home. Because
laws like that at issue in this case
are rarely enforced, these interests
are implicated more theoretically
than actually. Sodomy laws most
deeply affect gays by allowing others
to brand them as criminals, as petitioners point out. Gays' presumptive
criminal status, in turn, is used
legally to justify outright discrimination against them, as in the child
custody and adoption context, in
which courts have pointed to the
existence of sodomy laws as a reason to restrict parenting by gays.
This presumptive criminal status is
also used politically to deny gays
legislative protection from private

discrimination in employment, publie accommodations, and housing.
It is this secondary, though profound and debilitating, practical
function of sodomy laws that most
affects gays.
Though Texas understandably
argues the case as implicating the
power of the states in our federal
system to regulate on the basis of
public morality, and the need for
judicial restraint in defining rights,
social conservatives see a much
more fundamental issue. For them,
holding the line against advances in
gay equality is needed to preserve
traditional sexual morality and to
secure the preeminent place of traditional nuclear families as a
bedrock of social stability.
Invalidating sodomy laws, in their
view, would be another incremental
legal step on the road to allowing
same-sex marriage, an end they
view as very undesirable. This "slippery slope" is emphasized by many
of Texas's supporting amici, though
not mentioned by Texas itself.
For these reasons, both sides in the
ongoing culture war over the place
of gays in American life view the
continued validity of sodomy laws
as precious ground to be defended
(in the case of social conservatives)
or captured (in the case of gayequality advocates) at all costs.
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